DayOne’s IPO: Measuring the Gap Between Bookings and Billings

Using Daloopa data to size how much of DODC’s contracted revenue depends on capacity still under construction

DayOne Data Centers filed a Form F-1 on October 5, 2026, to list on Nasdaq as DODC. (As a Cayman Islands foreign private issuer, it files an F-1 rather than an S-1.) Revenue for the six months ended June 30, 2026, was $512.0 million, up from $151.5 million a year earlier, and utilization of capacity in service was 98.7%.

Reported revenue reflects only the capacity already running. At June 30, DayOne had 1,786 MW of Bookings, of which 666 MW was billing. The remaining 1,120 MW, or 62.7% of the contracted book, was Backlog: signed contracts for capacity that is not yet generating revenue.1

Because the contracts are signed, Backlog is not a pipeline figure. But nearly all of it sits in buildings still under construction, and customers can terminate for late delivery, subject to cure periods. This post sizes that exposure, models delay and termination scenarios, and compares DODC with its listed peers.

Built vs. unbuilt capacity

Table 1 shows DayOne’s capacity KPIs at the last four reporting dates. Bookings is the total contracted book; Billings is the part generating revenue; Backlog is the difference.

MWDec 31, 2024Jun 30, 2025Dec 31, 2025Jun 30, 2026
Bookings4307631,2501,786
Billings (income generating)121213444666
Backlog (signed, not yet billing)3095508071,120
Backlog as % of Bookings171.9%72.1%64.6%62.7%
Capacity in service126222454675
Capacity under construction3185748301,125

Table 1. DayOne capacity KPIs. Every cell links to its source in Daloopa. Backlog share computed.

Table 1. DayOne capacity KPIs. Every reported cell links to its source in Daloopa. Backlog share is a model calculation.

Backlog has exceeded Billings at every reporting date. Billed MW has stayed between 28% and 37% of Bookings. With utilization near 99%, there is little spare built capacity to absorb a delay elsewhere.

The F-1 adds a Pre-Commitment Rate of 98.8% at June 30: the share of capacity under construction that is already contracted. Multiply that by 1,125 MW under construction, and about 1,112 MW of the 1,120 MW Backlog sits inside buildings that are not finished.2 More than 99% of the Backlog is unbuilt capacity.

Turning megawatts into revenue

MW shares are a clean measure, but the revenue exposure is what most analysts will want to size. We annualized Q2 2026 revenue of $291.6 million and divided by average billed MW during the quarter ( 474 MW at March 31 and 666 MW at June 30). That gives about $2.05 million of revenue per billed MW per year, including pass-through power.3

Table 2 applies that figure to Bookings at three dates. These are model outputs at a constant price, not company guidance.

US$ millions (annual)Dec 31, 2025Jun 30, 2026Sep 20, 2026 (F-1)
Revenue from capacity already billing$908$1,363$1,950
Revenue from Backlog (not yet delivered)$1,651$2,292$2,717
Stabilized revenue on all Bookings$2,560$3,654$4,667
Share from unbuilt facilities64.5%62.7%58.2%
Multiple of Q2 2026 run-rate revenue2.2x3.1x4.0x

Table 2. Stabilized revenue at a constant $2.05m per MW.4 Source: model built on Daloopa data; Sep 20 KPIs from the F-1.

What the model shows:

  • At June 30, the contracted book implies roughly $3.65 billion of annual revenue against a run-rate of about $1.17 billion.
  • About $2.29 billion a year, or 62.7%, depends on facilities DayOne has not yet delivered.
  • By September 20, the F-1 shows Bookings of 2,281 MW and Backlog of 1,328 MW. The unbuilt share eased to 58.2% because Billings rose, but the dollar exposure grew to about $2.72 billion.

Termination and delay terms

The F-1 risk factors set out the termination terms. Contracts can be terminated for material defaults including “delay of delivery and certain SLA related breaches, subject to certain cure periods.” The filing also discloses past delivery delays, caused by weather and mid-build changes in customer requirements, for which DayOne paid service credits. The company expects to deliver substantially all of its Bookings by December 31, 2028 and estimates $11.4 billion of remaining spend to get there.

Table 3 runs four termination scenarios on the September 20 Backlog. The termination shares are illustrative inputs, not estimates of likelihood.

Share of Backlog terminated5%10%20%30%
Annual revenue lost ($m)$136$272$543$815
vs. Q2 2026 run-rate revenue11.6%23.3%46.6%69.9%
Remaining build cost on those MW ($m)$570$1,140$2,280$3,420
vs. cash + short-term investments16.9%33.7%67.4%101.1%

Table 3. Termination scenarios on the Sep 20, 2026 Backlog. Remaining build cost uses cost to complete per Backlog MW ($8.6m).5

In the 10% scenario, lost revenue equals about 23% of the Q2 2026 run-rate, and about $1.1 billion of partly built capacity would need to be re-leased. A delay without termination has a smaller effect in the model. If a quarter of Backlog slips by one quarter, about $170 million of revenue moves out.6

How DODC compares with peers

To put these figures in context, we pulled the same metrics from Daloopa for CoreWeave, Nebius, IREN and Applied Digital, with Digital Realty and Equinix as established operators for reference.

Calendar Q2 2026DODCCRWVNBISIRENAPLDDLREQIX
Revenue ($m)$292$2,575$582$137$259$1,924$2,625
Revenue growth YoY241%112%454%-27%581%29%16%
Adj. EBITDA margin41%59%41%14%16%51%53%
Capex / revenue6.1x3.6x9.8x14.4xn.a.0.4xn.a.
Contracted, not yet in service62.7%59.5%n.a.75.0%n.a.20.6%n.a.
RPO / annualized revenue4.2x10.1x16.1xn.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.
Largest customer % of revenue69.2%36%n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.
Net debt / annualized Adj. EBITDA3.1x4.3x0.5x16.6x20.0x4.7x3.8x

Table 4. Peer comparison. Linked cells are Daloopa values; the rest are computed from Daloopa inputs.7 IREN and APLD fiscal quarters mapped to calendar Q2.

DODC’s unbuilt share is within the range of the other neocloud operators in the set:

  • CoreWeave had 3.7 GW contracted and 1.5 GW active, so 59.5% of its contracted power was not yet live.
  • IREN’s contracted ARR of $4 billion
    is four times its $1 billion operating ARR.
  • Digital Realty, a more established operator, has about a fifth of its contracted rent ($1.24 billion) not yet commenced.

On RPO relative to revenue, DODC’s ratio is lower than its neocloud peers’. Its RPO is 4.2x annualized revenue against 10.1x at CoreWeave ( $103.7 billion) and 16.1x at Nebius ( $37.5 billion). Its 41% margin matches Nebius, and its 3.1x leverage is below CoreWeave’s 4.3x.

Concentration is the clearest difference:

  • Customer A generated $354.2 million of 1H 2026 revenue, or 69.2%.8 CoreWeave’s largest customer fell to 36% of revenue from 71% a year earlier.
  • Malaysia produced $445.7 million, or 87.0% of revenue.

Delivery to Customer A is a key variable for Backlog conversion.

Where the build cost sits

Table 5 summarizes reported results, including how much interest DayOne capitalized.

US$ millionsFY2024FY20251H 20251H 2026
Revenue$178.1$484.3$151.5$512.0
Adjusted EBITDA$56.2$180.7$48.9$205.9
Net loss($57.6)($367.1)($12.6)($77.2)
Capex($953.1)($2,288.9)($919.9)($3,110.0)
Total interest cost$59.1$173.8$71.9$145.4
Interest capitalized$18.8$60.0$22.4$83.1
Share capitalized31.9%34.5%31.1%57.1%

Table 5. Financial summary. 1H Adjusted EBITDA is the sum of Daloopa quarterly values.9 Source: Daloopa.

Adjusted EBITDA margin of 40.2% in 1H 2026 reflects capacity already running. The cost of the unbuilt capacity sits on the balance sheet:

  • Construction in progress rose to $3.11 billion.
  • Long-term borrowings reached $4.35 billion.
  • In 1H 2026, DayOne capitalized 57.1% of its interest cost into construction, so that interest did not flow through the income statement.

Delivery timing affects how long interest is capitalized before the assets generate revenue. Liquidity at June 30 was $1.98 billion of cash plus $1.40 billion of short-term investments.

Why we did not use RPO

DayOne’s RPO rose 1.5% in 1H 2026 to $4.95 billion while Bookings rose 42.9%.10 At about $2.8 million per booked MW, it captures less than 1.5 years of revenue on contracts that mostly run 10 to 15 years. Reported RPO has not moved in line with Bookings, so we measured exposure in MW and used RPO only for the peer comparison.

Bull and bear variables to track

  • Bull: delivery track record. Capacity in service went from 126 MW to 675 MW in 18 months. The company states that it builds in about 12 months at below industry cost. Whether that pace holds is the main variable for Backlog conversion.
  • Bull: contract terms. Cure periods and force majeure carve-outs give DayOne some room. In a capacity-constrained market, customers may have limited incentive to terminate on a nearly finished hall.
  • Bear: delivery scale. DayOne plans to deliver roughly 1.4x its current in-service footprint across six markets in about two years. Each new market adds permitting, power and contractor risk, which the filing describes in detail.

How we built the analysis

The analysis was built in a six-tab Excel workbook covering inputs, unbuilt exposure, delay sensitivity, financials, RPO and peers. Daloopa-sourced figures link to their sources, as in the tables above. Three assumptions drive the scenarios: new-build pricing premium, termination share and delay share. The calculations behind each table are in the notes below.

Notes on data and calculations

  1. Backlog as % of Bookings = Backlog MW / Bookings MW at each date.
  2. Backlog in unfinished buildings = Capacity under construction x Pre-Commitment Rate.
  3. Revenue per billed MW = Q2 2026 revenue x 4 / average of Mar 31 and Jun 30, 2026 Billings. Includes pass-through power.
  4. Stabilized revenue = Bookings x $2.05m, price held flat. Run-rate = Q2 2026 revenue x 4. Model assumption, not company guidance.
  5. Remaining build cost per Backlog MW = F-1 cost to complete ($11.4bn) / Sep 20, 2026 Backlog (1,328 MW). A rough proxy.
  6. Deferred revenue = 25% x Backlog revenue / 4. Service credits and fee reductions for lateness are not modeled.
  7. Calendar Q2 2026 unless noted; DODC capex on 1H 2026. Not yet in service = 1 minus live / contracted (MW for DODC, power for CRWV, ARR for IREN, rent for DLR). Leverage = net debt / (Q2 Adj. EBITDA x 4); DLR as reported. IREN and APLD leverage is distorted by low current EBITDA.
  8. Customer A and Malaysia shares = 1H 2026 segment revenue / total revenue.
  9. 1H Adjusted EBITDA = sum of Daloopa Q1 and Q2 values.
  10. RPO and Bookings change measured Dec 31, 2025 to Jun 30, 2026. RPO per MW = total RPO / Bookings.

Data sources: The September 20 KPIs, termination language, Pre-Commitment Rate and cost to complete come directly from the DayOne Form F-1 on EDGAR and are labeled as such in the tables and model.

This is research commentary, not investment advice.

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